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Abstract 
Davidson has attempted to offer his own solution to the problem of self-knowledge, but there 
has been no consensus between his commentators on what this solution is. Many have claimed 
that Davidson’s account stems from his remarks on disquotational specifications of self-
ascriptions of meaning and mental content, the account which I will call the “Disquotational 
Explanation”. It has also been claimed that Davidson’s account rather rests on his version of 
content externalism, which I will call the “Externalist Explanation”. I will argue that not only 
are these explanations of self-knowledge implausible, but Davidson himself has already 
rejected them. Thus, neither can be attributed to Davidson as his suggested account of self-
knowledge. I will then introduce and support what I take to be Davidson’s official and 
independent account of self-knowledge, that is, his “Transcendental Explanation”. I will defend 
this view against certain potential objections and finally against the objections made by 
William Child. 
Keywords: Self-Knowledge; Disquotational Explanation; Externalist Explanation; 
Transcendental Explanation; Davidson; Wright; Child. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Davidson has famously taken an anti-Cartesian, third-personal point of view to be essential to 
the study of meaning and linguistic understanding, the view which manifests itself in his 
extensive use of the notion of interpretation. According to this view, “[w]hat a fully informed 
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interpreter could know about what a speaker means is all there is to learn; the same goes for 
what the speaker believes” (Davidson 1983, 148).1 What is the consequence of this view for 
the discussion of first-person authority, the authority which we, with a strong intuition, concede 
a speaker has over the content of her semantical and mental states? This paper investigates 
Davidson’s answer to this question. He, perhaps contrary to Quine,2 does not deny the existence 
of such a difference between the speaker, as the first-person, and the interpreter, as the second-
person, with regard to their knowledge of what the speaker means and believes. The problem 
of self-knowledge concerns explaining the fact that we know ourselves directly and non-
inferentially, while others’ knowledge of our attitudes is indirect and inferential. The 
commentators on Davidson disagree on what his solution to the problem of self-knowledge is. 
My aim is to settle these controversies by answering the question what Davidson’s official 
account of first-person authority concerning mental and semantical content is. 
   I begin by an outline of Davidson’s remarks on the problem of self-knowledge. I will then 
introduce two main accounts of first-person authority which have been attributed to Davidson, 
that is, the “Disquotational Explanation” and the “Externalist Explanation”. First of all, I will 
argue that these explanations are implausible. This, however, would not raise any problem for 
Davidson because, second of all, I will argue that Davidson himself has already rejected these 
explanations. I will conclude that these explanations have been wrongly attributed to Davidson 
as his official account and that his relevant remarks on disquotation and meaning-determination 
are to be considered as his description of the phenomenon, rather than his explanation of it. 
Finally, I will introduce a “Transcendental Explanation” as Davidson’s actual explanation of 
self-knowledge and argue that this account has been overlooked by the commentators on 
Davidson as his official, independent account of self-knowledge. 
 
                                                          
1 This view can be called “Interpretationism”. See, e.g., Byrne (1998), Dennett (1987 , Chapter 2), Child (1994, 
Chapter 1), Hossein Khani (2020a) and Bernecker (2013). 
2 Whether Quine’s project of radical translation, and his thesis of the indeterminacy of translation, result in a 
denial of first-person authority is a matter of controversy. See, e.g., Searle (1987), Blackburn (1984, 281), Glock 
(2003, 201-206), and Hylton (1990/91). 
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2. Davidson on Self-knowledge 
In his paper, “First Person Authority” (1984a), Davidson introduces the problem of self-
knowledge as follows:  
When a speaker avers that he has a belief, hope, desire or intention, there is a presumption that 
he is not mistaken, a presumption that does not attach to his ascriptions of similar mental states 
to others. … What accounts for the authority accorded first person present tense claims of this 
sort, and denied second or third person claims? (1984a, 3) 
Davidson seeks an explanation of such an asymmetry between the attributions of certain 
attitudes to ourselves and the attributions of similar attitudes to others, the existence of which 
we intuitively concede. In particular, Davidson is after an answer to this question: “What 
explains the difference in the sort of assurance you have that I am right when I say ‘I believe 
Wagner died happy’ and the sort of assurance I have?” (1984a, 11). He calls this asymmetry in 
knowledge of belief the “basic asymmetry” (1984a, 12).  
   Davidson’s explanation of thin basic asymmetry, or the asymmetry in the sort of guarantee 
my interpreter and I have of the correctness of my self-ascriptions, involves the process of 
interpretation, meaning-belief relation and holding-true attitudes. For Davidson, “to speak is to 
express thoughts” (1975, 155). Having granted that, he states that when a speaker utters a 
sentence, the interpreter assumes that the speaker holds her sentence to be true on that occasion 
and she does so for two reasons: “A speaker holds a sentence to be true because of what the 
sentence (in his language) means, and because of what he believes” (1973, 134).3 Now, as 
Davidson continues, “if you or I or anyone knows that I hold this sentence true on this occasion 
of utterance, and she knows what I meant by this sentence on this occasion of utterance, then 
she knows what I believe – what belief I expressed” (1984a, 11). This means that if my 
interpreter knows that I hold my uttered sentence to be true and if he knows what I mean by it, 
he would know what belief I have expressed by uttering it. Davidson’s first assumption is that 
“we can assume without prejudice that we both know … that on this occasion I do hold the 
sentence I uttered to be true” (1984a, 12). For him, no interesting asymmetry in knowledge of 
mental content has yet emerged because my interpreter and I are both granted knowledge of 
the fact that I hold this sentence to be true on this occasion. Things are otherwise, however, 
                                                          
3 See also Davidson (1974a, 142, 144-145, 152), (1975, 161-162, 167) and (1983, 147). 
4 
 
with respect to our knowledge of what I believe: “On these assumptions, I know what I believe, 
while you may not” (Davidson 1984a, 12). This is the basic asymmetry that he aims to explain.  
   Davidson’s next step to explain the belief-asymmetry is this: “The assumption that I know 
what I mean necessarily gives me, but not you, knowledge of what belief I expressed by my 
utterance” (1984a, 12). There is something that assures us of the fact that I am almost always 
right about what I mean by my utterance and if so, I would be almost always right about what 
belief I express by it, while there is no such an assurance for the interpreter. The question, 
however, is what does explain the difference in knowledge of meaning between me and my 
interpreter? Let’s call this asymmetry the “meaning-asymmetry”. 
   At this point, the consensus on how Davidson’s account proceeds disappears. In what 
follows, I will first introduce and criticize a reading of Davidson’s explanation of the meaning-
asymmetry which construes it as essentially relying on his remarks on disquotational 
specifications of meaning. This reading has been offered by a majority of the commentators on 
Davidson’s account, such as Wright (2001, 348-350), Thöle (1993), Picardi (1993), Beisecker 
(2003) and Hacker (1997). I call it the “Disquotational Explanation” and will argue that not 
only is such an explanation implausible in general, but Davidson himself has argued against it. 
Such a construal of Davidson’s remarks on self-knowledge fails to distinguish between the 
situations in which he is describing the problem of self-knowledge and the situations in which 
he is offering his own explanation of it. There is also another reading of Davidson’s explanation 
offered by, for instance, Child (2007, 2013), Beisecker (2003), Jacobsen (2009), Shoemaker 
(1996), Macdonald (1995) and Gallois (1997), who claim that Davidson’s explanation actually 
arises from his remarks on semantic externalism. I will discuss this explanation in Sections 5 
and 6.1 and argue that this explanation suffers from more or less similar problems. Finally, I 
will seek for an alternative explanation in Davidson’s works and argue that the sort of 
explanation that Davidson has had in mind has been a sort of “Transcendental Explanation”, 
which can explain the meaning-asymmetry in a way free from the problems which the above 
two readings face. I will end the paper by responding to Child’s objections to the attribution of 
such an explanation to Davidson. Let’s start by the Disquotational Explanation.  
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3. The Disquotational Explanation of Self-Knowledge 
How does Davidson explain the difference between me and my interpreter in the sort of 
assurance we have about the fact that I am right in my self-ascriptions of meaning? Davidson, 
at some point, states that  
the speaker, after bending whatever knowledge and craft he can to the task of saying what his 
words mean, cannot improve on the following sort of statement: “My utterance of ‘Wagner died 
happy’ is true if and only if Wagner died happy”. An interpreter has no reason to assume this 
will be his best way of stating the truth conditions of the speaker’s utterance. (1984a, 13).4 
This passage has given rise to a sort of reading of Davidson’s explanation of the meaning-
asymmetry which can be introduced as follows. Suppose that a speaker, X, utters “two plus 
two equals four”. In the case of an interpreter’s attributing meaning to X’s utterance, we will 
have the following sort of specification of what X’s utterance means: 
(I) X means two plus two equals four by her utterance of “two plus two equals four”.5 
Even this disquotational specification of what X means by her utterance can be overturned by 
further evidence of interpretation. For example, by borrowing the example Kripke’s 
Wittgenstein’s sceptic works with in the second chapter of Kripke’s book (1982), it is possible 
that the interpreter later finds out that X answers by “5”, rather than “125”, to the question “57 
+ 68 =?”. The speaker seems to mean something else, e.g., quus, and not plus, by “plus”. In 
this case, the evidence leads the interpreter to modify his interpretation and use a different 
sentence in order to give the truth-condition of the speaker’s uttered sentence:  
(II) X means two quus two equals four by her utterance of “two plus two equals four”. 
Any specification of what X means by her words, from the interpreter’s point of view, is 
hostage to evidence and apt to further “improvement” or “modification”. However, and this is 
the main point of the Disquotational Explanation, the same cannot be true in the case of self-
ascriptions of meaning, for instance, when we have the following specification: 
                                                          
4 See also Davidson (1989, 66). 
5 Or “X’s utterance of ‘two plus two equals four’ is true if and only if two plus two equals four”. 
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(III) I (presently) mean two plus two equals four by my utterance of “two plus two equals 
four”. 
There is no possibility of mismatch between the right-hand side and the left-hand side sentences 
in (III): any evidence which appears to be suggesting a re-interpretation of the right-hand side 
sentence will supposedly suggest the same re-interpretation of the left-hand side sentence. Any 
evidence suggesting that “plus” means quus applies to the mentioned sentence (on the right) as 
well as the used sentence (on the left). This is the reason why, for instance, Wright construes 
Davidson’s account as follows: while the interpreter’s attribution of meaning to me, “even one 
that uses that very sentence to specify the content in question, is hostage to the evidence of 
interpretation”, “when I use a sentence to specify disquotationally what I mean by it, there is 
no such hostage” (Wright 2001, 348). Wright continues:  
For whatever interpretation may teach you about the content I attach to the sentence in question 
will apply to both the mentioned and the used occurrences in my specification: whatever I mean 
by a sentence, S, I am guaranteed to be able to say with perfect accuracy what that sentence 
means merely by using it. ... I am uniquely assured of no error in the specification of what I 
believe. (2001, 348) 
In a similar vein, Thöle also states that “we should certainly agree with Davidson that [the 
disquotational] way of telling the meaning of a sentence provides the speaker, but not the 
interpreter, with a secure method for saying what he means” (1993, 245). Thus, the difference 
in the sort of assurance which me and my interpreter have of my being right about what I mean 
by my utterances comes from the fact that disquoting my uttered sentence and using it to specify 
what it means guarantees my success in correctly specifying what I mean by it, while there is 
no guarantee that doing the same thing in the case of the interpreter results in a correct 
interpretation of my utterance. The speaker’s best and only way to specify what she means by 
her utterance is to specify it in the disquotation way, while the interpreter’s best and only way 
to specify the meaning of the speaker’s utterance may not always be to specify it in the 
disquotational way. And supposedly this makes the speaker immune to errors of the sort the 
interpreter is always susceptible to.  
   In what follows, I will argue for two claims: (1) The Disquotational Explanation is an 
implausible account of self-knowledge. (2) More importantly, Davidson himself has rejected 
such a sort of explanation of self-knowledge. 
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4. On the Disquotational Explanation 
The first point to note is that the Disquotational Explanation results in the infallibility of the 
speaker’s authoritative knowledge of what she means and believes, while this is a claim that 
Davidson explicitly rejects: “First person authority is not infallible” (Davidson 1984a, 13). 
Davidson denies what Wright’s and Thöle’s readings attribute to him, i.e., that “I am uniquely 
assured of no error in the specification of what I believe”, as Wright said above, or that “the 
speaker, but not the interpreter, [is provided] with a secure method for saying what he means”, 
as Thöle said. Rather, for Davidson, I am not guaranteed with any immunity to error about what 
I mean and believe. The speaker is not always right because she may fail to speak in a way 
understandable to her interpreter: “It is possible for the evidence available to others to 
overthrow self-judgements” (Davidson 1984a, 4). According to Davidson, a speaker can be 
said to be successfully meaning something by her utterance if her utterance is interpreted as 
she intends.6 Otherwise, the speaker fails to mean anything at all and we can thereby say that 
the speaker has just thought, or it just seemed to her, that she meant something by her words. 
As Davidson puts it, “the speaker may fail in this project [of remaining interpretable to others] 
from time to time; in that case we can say … that he does not know what his words mean” 
(1984a, 13). It is also important to note that Davidson’s claim here is not that the words have a 
meaning but the speaker fails to know it. Rather, there would be no meaning to be known at 
all. This is part of the reason why I think Child’s (2007) interpretation of Davidson’s account 
of self-knowledge is problematic, according to which Davidson believes that there are cases in 
which my utterance has a meaning but I have no knowledge of what that meaning is, such as 
the cases in which the speaker intends to use her words in accordance with a socially accepted 
way. For Child, in this situation, the speaker knows her intention to use her words in that way, 
but since “she has no special, authoritative way of knowing what the word does mean on others’ 
lips, she has no special, authoritative knowledge of what it means on her lips, either” (2007, 
163). This is not a claim that Davidson endorses. For Davidson, it does not matter how a 
speaker uses her words, that is, whether she uses them in a socially accepted way or not; what 
matters is that the speaker fails to mean anything by her words if she fails to speak in an 
interpretable way. I will say more about this below and in Section 6.1. 
                                                          
6 According to Davidson, “if the speaker is understood he has been interpreted as he intended to be interpreted” 
(1986, 93). See also Davidson (1986, 97, 99, 101, 1994, 120, 1991), and (1992, 111-112, 116, 1987, 28). 
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   More importantly, there are two main questions regarding the Disquotational Explanation 
which need to be answered by Davidson if it is the view that he officially holds: (I) Suppose 
that when the speaker makes a self-ascription of meaning, she does so in the disquotational 
way. Is doing so sufficient to show that she knows what she means by her utterance? (II) For 
the speaker, in order to specify what she means by her utterance, is it necessary that she does 
so in the disquotational way? Let’s start by the question about sufficiency. 
   Consider this statement: 
(IV) I mean Está lloviendo by my utterance of “Está lloviendo”. 
This statement is always true. But the point is that I can always give the meaning of any 
sentence like this by simply disquoting it on the left-hand side of the statements like (IV). I, 
however, ex hypothesi do not know what “Está lloviendo” means. Although I do not know what 
the sentence means, I will always be right in so specifying the truth-condition, that is, the 
meaning of that sentence.7  
   One may object that here, ex hypothesi, the speaker does not know Spanish – she is an English 
speaking speaker – and thus she does not understand what that sentence means. But this is the 
whole point of the example. It may be better to rewrite (IV) as follows: 
(V) I mean Está lloviendo in Spanish by my utterance of “Está lloviendo”. 
The speaker may not know the language but she is still capable of using the disquotational 
method to correctly specify what that sentence means. The speaker’s ability to disquotationally 
specify the meaning of such sentences does not show that she has any authoritative, non-
inferentially knowledge of what her utterance means. For instance, Child (2013) has claimed 
that Davidson’s point on disquotational specifications of meaning in the case of self-ascriptions 
is to be read as claiming something like the following: “Suppose … I know what it means. Then 
                                                          
7 This problem can be put in terms of the difference between knowing-how and knowing-that, that is, the difference 
between the speaker’s knowing that “S” means S and the speaker’s knowing how to use S. Knowing how to use 
S to specify what “S” means is one thing, knowing what “S” means is another. The Disquotational Explanation 
reduces knowing-that to knowing-how: as if once I know how to use S to specify the meaning of “S” by simply 
disquoting “S”, I thereby know what “S” means; as if knowing how to use S is all we need to explain the speaker’s 
authoritative knowledge of what “S” means. As indicated above, this would not suffice to show that the speaker 
knows what “S” means. I am thankful to an anonymous referee for this journal for drawing my attention to this 
point. On this distinction, see also Jacobsen (2009). 
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I can use that sentence to state its own meaning in a way that is proof against the kind of error 
to which I am vulnerable when I use my words to state the meanings of someone else’s words” 
(2013, 538, emphasis added). This claim, however, is question-beginning because it 
presupposes what was promised to be explained, that is, the speaker’s knowledge of what her 
utterance means. This explanation fails to explain the essential difference which we already 
concede there is between the speaker’s knowledge of the meaning of her utterance and the 
interpreter’s knowledge of what the speaker’s utterance means. We were after explaining what 
makes it the case that I have non-inferential knowledge of what I mean. But, instead of 
explaining that, we have presupposed that she does already know what she means and that if 
she does know what she means, she can specify it by using the disquotational method. Not only 
is this explanation question-begging, but it also results in taking the speaker to be infallible, 
immune to error in specifying the meaning of her utterances; as previously indicated, this is a 
claim that Davidson rejects.  
   One may insist that the speaker, but not the interpreter, is bound to specify the meaning of 
her utterance in the disquotational way because the speaker is to use the same language, her 
own language, to specify the meaning of her own words, while the interpreter has his own 
idiolect, or in this sense, his own language to specify the meaning of the speaker’s utterance. 
But this move does not work either. For it would not be impossible to imagine that the speaker’s 
and the interpreter’s languages are the same, even their idiolects.8 For instance, assume that 
they are identical twins who have learnt their first language under the same kind of (triangular) 
situation. On this scenario, they both mean the same thing by the same words: they both mean 
arrangement by “arrangement”, green by “green”, and so on. We can say that they are almost 
alike in being immune to errors about the meaning of one another’s utterances because they are 
both capable of disquotationally specifying what the other’s utterances mean. They both know 
what the other’s sentences mean because their languages are the same. The point is that, even 
in this situation, we still need an explanation of self-knowledge because the asymmetry does 
not disappear in this case. The reason is that although supposedly they speak the same language, 
mean the same thing by the same words, and know what those words mean, the speaker knows 
what she means by her utterance in a different way. The interpreter lacks such non-inferential 
authoritative knowledge, though he, like the speaker, is capable of specifying what the speaker 
means by her utterance by employing the disquotational method. The original asymmetry is 
                                                          
8 On this possibility see Ludwig (1994, 388-389). 
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left unexplained. These points are related to my second question as to whether it is necessary 
that self-ascriptions of meaning are specified disquotationally. 
   It seems that the asymmetry exists even when the way in which the speaker can specify what 
she means by her words is not best specifiable in the disquotational way. Recall Davidson’s 
example of Mrs. Malaprop: she meant a nice arrangement of epithets when she uttered “A nice 
derangement of epitaphs”.9 According to Davidson, the hearer usually has no problem 
understanding what Mrs. Malaprop means by her utterance if there is enough evidence and clue 
for him to reach Mrs. Malaprop’s intended interpretation of the utterance. Surely there is still 
this difference: Mrs. Malaprop non-inferentially knows what she means by her utterance, while 
the interpreter, as Davidson says, relies on evidence, observation, and much general 
information to successfully interpret Mrs. Malaprop’s utterance. The sentence that Mrs. 
Malaprop uttered was “A nice derangement of epitaphs”. When could we say that the 
interpreter has correctly interpreted this utterance? According to Davidson, we can say so only 
when the interpreter interprets Mrs. Malaprop’s utterance as meaning a nice arrangement of 
epithets, since, ex hypothesi, this is the way Mrs. Malaprop intends her utterance to be 
understood. Now, can’t we say that Mrs. Malaprop knows herself to mean epithet by “epitaph”, 
or arrangement by “derangement”? I believe, on Davidson’s view, we can and, in what follows, 
I will argue for why it is so.  
   For Davidson, we use the same words to mean different things every day and our hearers 
have no trouble understanding what we say.10 Mrs. Malaprop has non-inferential knowledge of 
what she means by “epitaph”; and note that what she means by it is not epitaph. We can say 
that she cannot generally improve on the following sort of statement:  
(a) I mean epithet by “epitaph”. 
There is no problem in saying that her language (idiolect) includes both such words. But the 
point is that if she uses the disquotational method, she fails to specify what she really intended 
to mean by this utterance. She is not bound to specify what she means only in the disquotational 
way. This is so while her interpreter has no immediate reason to take either of the following 
statements as offering his best interpretation of Mrs. Malaprop’s utterance of “epitaph”:  
                                                          
9 See Davidson (1986, 90, 94-95, 103-104) and (1994, 115). 
10 See Davidson (1986, 89-90, 98-99) and (1994, 115). 
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(b) Mrs. Malaprop means epitaph by “epitaph”. 
(c) Mrs. Malaprop means epithet by “epitaph”. 
(d) Mrs. Malaprop means epiphany by “epitaph”. 
The interpreter might choose one of the above or other interpretations of Mrs. Malaprop’s 
utterance and check its plausibility against further evidence. However, this is not what happens 
in the case of Mrs. Malaprop’s self-ascriptions of meaning. This is exactly the kind of 
asymmetry that was supposed to be explained and this asymmetry has nothing to do with the 
claim that Mrs. Malaprop’s self-ascriptions of the meaning of her utterances are to be 
disquotational. This claim is perfectly compatible with, and actually follows from, Davidson’s 
later view of meaning. In order to see how, let’s focus a bit more on this view, especially on 
the Davidsonian distinction between “first (or literal) meaning” and “speaker-meaning”. 
   Davidson believes that “meaning … gets its life from those situations in which someone 
intends (or assumes or expects) that his words will be understood in a certain way, and they 
are” (1994, 120). This notion of meaning is what Davidson calls that of “literal” or “first” 
meaning of utterances: “How he intended to be understood, and was understood, is what he, 
and his words, literally meant on that occasion” (Davidson 1994, 120). It is called “first 
meaning” (Davidson 1986, 91) because this is the meaning that the interpreter should grasp 
first if he is to be able to understand other meanings, intentions, subsequent effects and ulterior 
purposes the speaker has in mind when she utters those words. Let’s call these the “speaker-
meanings” (Davidson 1986, 91). For instance, her friend may use Mrs. Malaprop’s utterance 
of “That’s a nice derangement of epitaphs” to make an irony, a complement, and the like.11 
None of these can be understood if he fails to interpret Mrs. Malaprop’s utterance as meaning 
that that’s a nice arrangement of epithets. First meaning comes first in the order of 
interpretation and it is what the uttered words literally mean on that occasion. Davidson 
clarifies this claim by distinguishing between “passing” and “prior” theories of interpretation:  
For the hearer, the prior theory expresses how he is prepared in advance to interpret an utterance 
of the speaker, while the passing theory is how he does interpret the utterance. For the speaker, 
the prior theory is what he believes the interpreter’s prior theory to be, while his passing theory 
is the theory he intends the interpreter to use. (1986, 101) 
                                                          
11 On this, see Ludwig and Lepore (2005, 265-266). 
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For Davidson, “what two people need, if they are to understand one another through speech, is 
the ability to converge on passing theories from utterance to utterance” (1986, 106). This is just 
to restate that the interpreter must interpret the speaker’s utterance in the way the speaker 
intended it to be understood. This is the conclusion of Davidson’s argument against the sort of 
view which claims that the existence of, and conforming to, certain conventions about the 
meaning of words is “necessary to the existence of communication by language” (1984b, 
265).12 Davidson, however, believes that in order for communication between two people to 
be successful, conforming to such conventions – or following certain rules determining the 
correct use of words – is neither necessary nor sufficient. It is not necessary because we can 
understand what Mrs. Malaprop means by “epitaph” on this specific occasion without 
appealing to the conventional meaning of the word. After all, the conventional, standard, or 
dictionary-based meaning of “epitaph” is epitaph, not epithet. Nor is knowledge of the 
conventional meaning of the words sufficient for the communication between them to be 
successful because in order to understand what Mrs. Malaprop means by “epitaph”, even if she 
means what “epitaph” conventionally means in her speech-community, we need knowledge 
and information over and above mere knowledge of what “epitaph” conventionally means: “It 
is derived by wit, luck, and wisdom from a private vocabulary and grammar, knowledge of the 
ways people get their point across, and rules of thumb for figuring out what deviations from 
the dictionary are most likely” (Davidson 1986, 107). For instance, we need to know that Mrs. 
Malaprop now intends her utterance to be interpreted in the standard way and this requires a 
sort of knowledge additional to mere knowledge of the conventional meaning of the words.13 
As Davidson says, “even when a speaker is speaking in accord with a socially acceptable theory 
he speaks with the intention of being understood in a certain way” (1994, 122). 
   Davidson believed that the interpreter’s and the speaker’s passing theories must converge if 
their communication is to be successful. In the case of Mrs. Malaprop’s utterance, as Davidson 
puts it, “Mrs. Malaprop’s theory, prior and passing, is that ‘A nice derangement of epitaphs’ 
means a nice arrangement of epithets” (1986, 103). In this passage, Davidson’s own example 
has just provided us with a non-disquotational specification of meaning in the case of Mrs. 
Malaprop’s self-ascription of meaning. If, according to Mrs. Malaprop’s passing theory, she 
                                                          
12 Davidson characterizes this view differently in several of his writings. Cf. Davidson (1986, 102), (1994, 110), 
and (1991, 143). 
13 For more on this point, see Hossein Khani (2020b). 
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means that’s a nice arrangement of epithets by her utterance of “That’s a nice derangement of 
epitaphs”, Mrs. Malaprop’s self-ascription of meaning cannot be specified disquotationally in 
this case. From these points it follows that Davidson does not believe that it is necessary that 
self-ascriptions of meaning are specified disquotationally. As he takes malapropisms and 
similar phenomena to be “ubiquitous” (1986, 89), the Disquotational Explanation cannot be 
regarded as his intended explanation of self-knowledge. Attributing this explanation to 
Davidson as his official account is to misconstrue his view. This is the reason why Davidson 
confesses that his “article ‘First Person Authority’ perhaps did not sufficiently emphasize that 
my ‘solution’ to the problem about self-attributions of attitudes depended on my theory of 
meaning” (1993b, 250). 
   What I have argued for so far would also rule out another parallel misconstrual of Davidson’s 
account, according to which self-ascriptions of meaning are to be disquotationally specified 
because it is a convention of the speaker’s language to do so in such cases. Davidson, as 
previously indicated, is generally against the views that take the existence of such conventions 
to be necessary or sufficient for success in understanding what the speaker means by her 
utterances. His arguments against such Conventionalist (and Communitarianist) views appear 
first in his paper “Communication and Convention” (1984b), followed mainly by “A Nice 
Derangement of Epitaphs” (1986), “The Second Person” (1992) and “The Social Aspect of 
Language” (1994). The limitations of space do not allow me to unpack his criticisms of this 
view here. But Davidson, in criticizing Strawson’s account of self-knowledge, makes a similar 
point, which also helps to clarify why his explanation of self-knowledge cannot be the 
Disquotational one.  
   For Davidson, it is just an “uninformative and unexplained claim that it is a convention of 
language to treat self-ascriptions with special respect” (1984a, 10), that “a speaker who 
sincerely uses a certain sort of sentence must be presumed to be right in what he says” (1984a, 
10). Such claims are question-begging because they presuppose what was promised to be 
explained: they just state that we “should interpret self-ascriptions in such a way as … to assign 
a special priority to their truth” (Davidson 1984a, 10). However, what reason do we have for 
treating them in this way? To say this is just to repeat, or re-describe the problem: “Self-
ascriptions have special authority: true; and that is where we began” (Davidson 1984a, 10). To 
claim that the speaker is bound to disquotationally specify what she means by her utterance, as 
a matter of conforming to some convention, takes us back to the problem of explaining why 
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there must be such different criteria in the application of the terms like “means that” and 
“believes that”. For Davidson, “we may postulate different criteria of application for the key 
concepts or words (‘believes that’, ‘intends to’, ‘wishes that’, etc.). But these moves do no 
more than restate the problem” (1984a, 11). This forms Davidson’s main objection to what he 
calls the “Wittgensteinian views”, such as that of Strawson’s, which aim to explain the 
meaning-asymmetry by appealing to the claim that self-ascriptions of meaning (and thus of 
belief) are not based on evidence or observation, while others’ ascriptions of meaning (and 
belief) to the speaker are.14 It is the role evidence plays in such ascriptions that supposedly 
explains the asymmetries in question. Davidson correctly detects a deep problem with such 
accounts: “This feature of first person authority, suggestive as it may be, does not help explain 
the authority” (Davidson 1984a, 5). He cites two reasons for this claim. According to the first,   
it is a strange idea that claims made without evidential or observational support should be favored 
over claims with such support. Of course, if evidence is not cited in support of a claim, the claim 
cannot be impugned by questioning the truth or relevance of the evidence. But these points hardly 
suffice to suggest that in general claims without evidential support are more trustworthy than those 
with. (1987, 16)15 
Nonetheless, I do not think that this claim by itself suffices to rule out the aforementioned 
Wittgensteinian view since the view after all offers some explanation of why we should 
distinguish between self-ascriptions of meaning and others’ ascriptions of meaning to the 
speaker. Davidson’s more important objection to these views is that they invite scepticism 
about other minds. For him, identifying a concept as the concept it is, for the most part, relies 
on the sort of application conditions we have for it. “A table” is the concept it is partly because 
it is (as intended by the speaker on a specific occasion) applicable to certain things only (i.e., 
tables) and not to other things. If we have two radically different criteria – or application 
conditions – for supposedly the same concept or expression, or, as Davidson puts it, “if what 
is apparently the same expression is sometimes correctly employed on the basis of a certain 
range of evidential support and sometimes on the basis of another range of evidential support 
(or none), the obvious conclusion would seem to be that the expression is ambiguous” (1987, 
16). For Davidson, similar considerations apply to the application of expressions like “believes 
                                                          
14 Wittgenstein’s account of the meaning-asymmetry is based on the differences between the rules governing the 
application of the expressions like “means that” and “believes that” as they are used in different language games. 
Strawson’s account is based on such a Wittgensteinian view.  
15 See also Davidson (1984a, 5). 
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that” and “means that”. He asks: “Why then should we suppose that a predicate like ‘x believes 
that …’, which is applied sometimes on the basis of behavioral evidence and sometimes not, is 
unambiguous?” (1987, 16). And if it is ambiguous, we have no reason to assume that it 
preserves its meaning when used by the speaker in the case of self-attributions of attitudes and 
by the speaker in the case of attributing them to others. This would invite the sceptic who 
questions whether the attitudes we are attributing to ourselves are the same as those we attribute 
to others. This is the reason why Davidson thinks that “Strawson and Wittgenstein had 
described the asymmetry, but had done nothing to explain it” (1993a, 211).16 Therefore, for 
Davidson, all the views which claim that the asymmetry is explained by appealing to the fact 
that self-ascriptions of meaning are not based on evidence, while others’ ascriptions of meaning 
to the speaker are, “merely restated the asymmetry without explaining it” (1993b, 249). It is 
easy to see how this objection can be re-applied to the Disquotational Explanation: this account 
does nothing to explain the asymmetry; it rather offers two radically different criteria for the 
application of “means that”. 
   If Davidson’s remarks on self-knowledge is to be read as so far suggested, how should we 
interpret Davidson’s claim that the speaker cannot generally “improve” on the statements like 
“My utterance of ‘Wagner dies happy’ is true if and only if Wagner died happy”? I think 
Davidson here is describing the meaning-asymmetry in certain cases, rather than explaining it. 
He is describing the sort of situations in which self-ascriptions of meaning can best be specified 
by using the disquotational method. Normally, the best I can do is to give the meaning of my 
utterance by using that sentence. I utter “It’s raining” and if I mean it’s raining by it, this is 
best specifiable via simply disquoting the uttered sentence. I may, however, mean something 
different by my utterance. In such cases, as Davidson says, “the speaker … cannot wonder 
whether he generally means what he says” (1984a, 12). This is, as indicated above, the way 
Davidson describes the asymmetry since the question remains as to what explains such an 
asymmetry in knowledge of meaning. Therefore, we should carefully distinguish between the 
situations in which Davidson is offering his own explanation and the situations in which he is 
merely describing the asymmetry by, for instance, appealing to the notion of evidence, or that 
of disquotational specifications of meaning.  
                                                          
16 See also Davidson (1993b, 248-249). For Strawson’s account, see Strawson (1959). 
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   So far, I have argued that the Disquotational Explanation is not plausible; nor is it Davidson’s 
official explanation of self-knowledge since it is incompatible with Davidson’s fundamental 
remarks on meaning, communication and self-knowledge. The Disquotational Explanation is 
not really part of Davidson’s explanans; rather a re-description of his explanandum, though it 
was not even a comprehensive description of the explanandum. Those like Wright (2001, 348-
350), Thöle (1993), Aune (2012, 216-217), Child (2007, 159, 2013, 536), Ludwig and Lepore 
(2005, 353-354) and many others who claim that Davidson’s official explanation comes from 
his remarks on the disquotational specification of self-ascriptions of meaning and belief have 
misrepresented Davidson’s account: they failed to distinguish between the situations in which 
he describes the asymmetry and those in which he is explaining it. Before introducing the 
explanation which I think Davidson has actually had in mind in his discussion of self-
knowledge, it is worth considering a different reading of Davidson’s account which construes 
it as an Externalist Explanation of self-knowledge. 
 
5. The Externalist Explanation 
It has been claimed that the speaker is always capable of disquotationally specifying what she 
means by her utterance because the cause of her utterance and that of the sentence she uses to 
specify the meaning of that utterance is the same. For instance, Child (2007) states that, 
according to Davidson, “I will always be able to supplement the disquotational statement by 
identifying objects or events to which the word applies” (2007, 162). This Externalism 
Explanation and the Disquotational Explanation are not meant to be mutually exclusive, though 
the Externalist Explanation does not need to provide support for the Disquotational Explanation 
or to entail it. As we will see, it can be regarded as an independent explanation claiming that 
speakers know what they mean by their words because the meaning of their words is 
determined by the things in the world which typically cause them to apply those words to. 
However, for similar reasons previously discussed, I think it is already clear that this attempt 
would not be successful in explaining the meaning-asymmetry and that it cannot be taken to be 
Davidson’s official explanation of self-knowledge. For one thing, Davidson says that “the 
agent herself … is not in a position to wonder whether she is generally using her own words to 
apply to the right objects and events” (1987, 37). But, as he emphasizes, by so describing the 
asymmetry, we have “done nothing to explain it” (1984a, 8) since “it remains to show why 
there must be a presumption that speakers, but not their interpreters, are not wrong about what 
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their words mean” (1984a, 12) and, considering Davidson’s externalism about content, we can 
add that it remains to show why there must be a presumption that speakers, but not their 
interpreters, are not wrong in identifying the objects or events to which they apply their words. 
I agree with Child on his claim that “[e]verything depends on what explains the presumption” 
(2007, 164); I do not, however, agree with him on the claim that Davidson’s explanation of this 
presumption comes from his (externalist) considerations about meaning-determination. For 
consider the situation in which two subjects are learning their first language. At least in such 
basic situations, we can assume that both of them, i.e., the speaker and the interpreter, speak 
the same language. By way of Davidson’s remarks on externalism, this is just to say that they 
have been (typically) caused by the same things – the same stimuli in the world – to respond 
in the same way. They both respond by “table”, for instance, in the presence of the whole table 
in view and hence, according to this explanation, they both can be said to mean table by that 
utterance. The problem is that, given all these, the asymmetry is still left unexplained: What 
does explain the sort of difference there is between the speaker’s knowledge of what she means 
by “table” and the interpreter’s knowledge of the meaning of the speaker’s utterance? This is a 
problem very similar to that which was discussed in the case of the Disquotational Explanation. 
  Child claims that “[Davidson’s] fundamental justification for the presumption that speakers 
generally know what their words mean comes from considerations about meaning-
determination; it does not come directly from considerations about the process or procedure of 
interpretation” (2007, 165). Child too seems to overlook the difference between Davidson’s 
description of the asymmetry and his explanation of it. It is true that, for Davidson, “the agent 
… [cannot] wonder whether she is generally using her own words to apply to the right objects 
and events” (Davidson 1987, 37). This passage form Davidson is the main reason for Child to 
attribute the Externalist Explanation to him. But Davidson’s treatment of the asymmetry has 
shown us that this is not the way in which the asymmetry can be explained. At most, we are 
describing it. For the problem still is to explain why there is such a difference, such a 
presumption; why does the agent have such authoritative knowledge of the meaning of her 
words so determined? It is one thing to claim that what you mean by your words is partly 
determined by what cause you to utter those words – given Davidson’s externalism, the external 
causes contribute to the determination of the content. But it is completely another to explain 
why the speaker has authoritative knowledge of such meanings. Does the speaker have 
authoritative knowledge of the meaning of her utterances simply because of having direct 
knowledge of the causes of her responses? It is dubious whether we can make a clear sense of 
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the claim that one has direct knowledge of what causes one’s responses and a strange enough 
claim to doubt its whole plausibility. Nonetheless, even given that one can be credited with 
such knowledge, we can still see that our original problem is merely relocated: What does 
explain such a difference between the speaker and the interpreter with regard to their 
knowledge of such causes? We have, as Davidson said, re-stated the problem. Moreover, there 
are utterances which are not directly prompted by such external causes. Do we need to track 
the causes of such utterances back to their external ancestors in order to be credited with 
authoritative knowledge of the meaning of our utterances? In what sense, then, is our 
knowledge of the meaning of such utterances non-inferential for us? This is one reason why 
the Externalist Explanation cannot explain the “how” question with regard to self-knowledge 
either. The “how” question concerns explaining how it is that we know ourselves non-
inferentially, while others have no such knowledge of what we mean and believe. How can 
each speaker acquire first-personal authoritative knowledge of what she means and believes? 
The Externalist Explanation is stuck at the level of explaining whether there is such an 
asymmetry at all, that is, it even fails to answer the “why” question with regard to self-
knowledge. I will come back to this issue again in Section 6.1. 
   What Child takes to be Davidson’s “fundamental justification” is indeed what Davidson is 
concerned with in his discussion of the notion of triangulation, which offers a causal 
explanation of meaning-determination, or better meaning-emergence. Davidson uses this 
notion to describe the primitive situations in which meaning and mental content may emerge, 
that is, the situations in which two creatures are assumed to similarly respond to the same 
stimulus in the world as well as to each other’s responses. Davidson’s aim is to say something 
constructive about what it takes for such creatures to come up with meaningful responses and 
contentful mental states.17 But we should note that this explanation adds nothing new to what 
Davidson has already offered in his discussion of interpretation since what Davidson eventually 
leads us to, in his discussion of triangulation, is to put even more emphasis on the essentiality 
of the process of interpretation, though this time a causal story has been added to such a 
process. As Davidson says, in order for the meaning of their responses to get determined, “each 
[of the triangulators] must speak to the other and be understood by the other … they must each 
be an interpreter of the other” (1992, 121). However, it is crucial to bear it in mind that 
                                                          
17 For Davidson’s discussion of triangulation, see Davidson (2001c, 8-9), (1997, 26-27), (1992, 117) and (1982, 
327). I will return to this discussion in Section 6.1. 
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regardless of what caused me to utter the words I did, the problem is to explain why I non-
inferentially know what I mean by my so caused utterance. Suppose again that the whole table 
in view caused me to utter “table”. Why do I know what I mean by my utterance of “table” 
differently from the way the second-person can know what I meant by it? For Davidson, regular 
application of words to objects in the world by itself would do nothing to determine the 
meaning of the speaker’s words, unless the speaker’s utterance is successfully interpreted by 
at least another speaker. If so, then once you can eventually be considered as a competent user 
of a language, “you can change the meaning provided you believe … that the interpreter has 
adequate clues for the new interpretation” (Davidson 1986, 98). I may intend to mean chair, 
table, tree, or anything else by my utterance of “table” which is caused by the same specific 
aspect of an object in view. I may even mean something entirely new by that word. The object, 
e.g., the table in view, in this sense, has never caused me to utter “table” to mean that new 
thing. If my utterance is interpreted as I intended, that is, to be meaning what I intended it to 
mean, that meaning is what my word literally means on that occasion and, consequently, I non-
inferentially know it. Regular application of words to certain things in the world, hence, does 
not provide us with any explanation of self-knowledge of the sort Davidson has promised.  
   However, if the above two explanations that have been attributed to Davidson are implausible 
and have been already rejected by Davidson, what is his official explanation? 
 
6. Davidson’s Transcendental Explanation of Self-Knowledge 
I think Davidson’s explanation of self-knowledge is a transcendental one stemming from his 
remarks on the process of interpretation and this “Transcendental Explanation” is what Wright, 
Aune, Child, Thöle and many others have not considered as Davidson’s official explanation of 
self-knowledge. 
   Davidson’s claim was that if I non-inferentially know what I mean, I non-inferentially know 
what I believe, while the interpreter’s knowledge of what I mean and believe cannot be 
achieved in the same way. The interpreter reaches my belief only after successfully interpreting 
my utterance, that is, after engaging in the process of interpreting my utterance by utilizing the 
available evidence and clues. According to Davidson, in order to know what I mean and, hence, 
what I believe, I cannot, as he calls it, engage in such “a difficult inference” (1984a, 13). 
Davidson’s account, as so far introduced, leads to the claim that “a hearer interprets … on the 
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basis of many clues; … The speaker … cannot wonder whether he generally means what he 
says” (1984a, 12). These are still descriptions of the asymmetry. Davidson needs to explain 
why it is so. He says that if I know what I mean by my utterance,  
it follows that I know what I believe, but it does not follow that you know what I believe. The 
reason is simple: you may not know what I mean. Your knowledge of what my words mean 
has to be based on evidence and inference: you probably assume you have it right, and you 
probably do. Nevertheless, it is a hypothesis. (1989, 66) 
But, we saw that making such a claim by itself is not enough. The promised explanation is not 
yet completed since the meaning-asymmetry remains to be explained. According to Davidson, 
there must be “a presumption that speakers, but not their interpreters, are not wrong about what 
their words mean” (1984a, 12). What is Davidson’s reason for the claim that there must be such 
a presumption?  
   Davidson’s explanation of the meaning-asymmetry comes from his remarks on the necessary 
conditions on the possibility of interpretation and this is one reason for why this explanation is 
transcendental. As Davidson says, “there is a presumption – an unavoidable presumption built 
into the nature of interpretation – that the speaker usually knows what he means” (1984a, 14, 
emphases added); this “presumption is essential to the nature of interpretation” (Davidson 
1984a, 12, emphases added). He emphasizes again that “the presumption … is essential … to 
my being interpretable at all” (1989, 66, emphases added). According to this Transcendental 
Explanation, if speakers were not mostly right about what they mean, interpretation would not 
be possible: there would be nothing to interpret and no such thing as interpretation at all. It is 
a necessary condition on the possibility of interpretation that speakers non-inferentially, that is, 
free from engaging in the process of interpreting themselves, know what they mean and believe. 
   In the beginning of “First Person Authority” (1984a, 3), Davidson points to a presumption 
regarding the existence of the asymmetry in question, which is already in play in our 
interactions with others and which needs to be accounted for. Presupposing the asymmetry in 
order to explain why it exists is one thing, presupposing the asymmetry without explaining it 
– and, as Wright (2001, 348-350), Thöle (1993) and others have accused Davidson of, taking 
for granted what was promised to be explained – is another. For instance, Wright says that 
“normally, we are credited with a special authority for the character of our own intentions”, 
and “a little reflection shows that both these features – non-inferentiality and indefinite 
‘fecundity’ – are simply characteristic of the normal intuitive notion of intention [and 
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meaning]” (2001, 111-112). Of course, Wright believes that we need to explain such features 
and in order to do so, he offers his judgement-dependent account of meaning and intention.18 
But, assuming that speakers are by default credited with such an authority is not a problem for 
him. It is surprising, however, that he criticizes Davidson for doing exactly the same.19 The 
problem with Wright’s accusation is that he misses the point that Davidson assumes the 
meaning-asymmetry in order to explain why it exists. As Davidson emphasizes in his criticism 
of Ryle, the problem with Ryle’s account of self-knowledge is that he “neither accepts nor 
explains the asymmetry; he simply denies that it exists. … I think it is obvious that the 
asymmetry exists” (1984a, 6). According to Ryle, we, as first-persons, only occupy a better 
position than others do to observe ourselves: the differences “are difference of degree, not of 
kind”, as Davidson construes Ryle’s view (Davidson 1984a, 5).20 For Davidson, however, these 
claims merely describe the symmetry.21 What Davidson offers in order to explain the meaning-
asymmetry (and hence the belief-asymmetry) is his Transcendental Explanation: the speaker’s 
knowledge of the meaning of her own utterances (and the content of her own attitudes) is direct 
and non-inferential, is not based on evidence and observation, and is not rested on the process 
of interpreting herself, because if it was so dependent, interpretation would not be possible.22 
One may object that the explanation as it stands is still incomplete because it needs to answer 
                                                          
18 For this account, see, e.g., Wright (2001), (1992) and (1988). 
19 See, e.g., Wright (2001, 349). 
20 For Ryle’s view, see Ryle (1949).  
21 Considering Davidson’s criticism of Ryle’s treatment of the problem of self-knowledge, it would be difficult to 
sympathize with Aune’s (2012) construal of Davidson’s account, according to which this account leads to the 
conclusion that “I am in a better position to know what I believe in holding true ‘I believe Wagner died happy’ 
than anyone else” (2012, 215). 
22 It is worth noting that this account can also explain what we may call the “attitude-asymmetry”. Davidson’s 
claim was that we can without prejudice assume that both the speaker and the interpreter know that when the 
speaker utters a sentence on an occasion, she holds it to be true on that occasion. Davidson states that he credits 
both the speaker and the interpreter with such knowledge of the speaker’s holding-true attitude (see, e.g., Davidson 
(1993b, 250)). Thus, it seems that no asymmetry between the speaker and the interpreter should arise with regard 
to knowledge of this attitude of the speaker. Call it the “attitude-asymmetry”. Elsewhere, he claims that it would 
“make the account circular to explain the basic asymmetry by assuming an asymmetry in the assurance you and I 
have that I hold the sentence I have just uttered to be a true sentence. There must be such an asymmetry, of course, 
but it cannot be allowed to contribute to the desired explanation” (1984a, 12). Here, his claim seems to be that 
there is such an “attitude-asymmetry” but it does no play any constitutive role in his account. The first claim seems 
implausible to me since there certainly is the “attitude-asymmetry” since after all the speaker knows her own 
attitudes, whatever they are, differently from the way her interpreter knows them. But I think Davidson is right in 
his second claim that such an asymmetry plays no constitutive role in his explanation since the attitude-asymmetry 
is intended by Davidson to be explained by his Transcendental Explanation. 
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the question why interpretation would not be possible if it was not the case that speakers have 
non-inferential knowledge of what they mean and believe.  
   Davison, I think, offers two reasons. He states that “what a speaker says can be misinterpreted 
by others, but it cannot be misinterpreted by the speaker because no content can be given to the 
idea of interpreting one’s own words” (1993b, 250). Here, the idea is that it simply makes no 
sense to claim that in order to know what the speaker means by her words she has to interpret 
herself. We can add that it does not make sense because doing so leads to a vicious regress of 
interpretations and, as a result, the speaker would never be able to intend or to mean anything 
at all: there is no finite list of conditions the speaker should take into account in order to intend 
her words to mean something specific and, thus, to reach something stable which can be 
interpreted by her interpreter at all.23 However, one may insist that even if we agree with 
Davidson on this point, it has not yet provided us with an answer to our question because 
although it does not make sense to claim that the speaker has to interpret herself in order to 
understand what she means and believes, it does not yet explain why this makes interpretation 
impossible in general. Davidson’s reply can simply be that, in that case, there would thereby 
be nothing for the interpreter to interpret. If the speaker cannot be said to be capable of 
intending her utterance to have a determinate interpretation, there would be nothing for the 
interpreter to interpret; he would have no reason to treat the speaker as a rational agent at all. 
Interpretation is possible, after all, if something interpretable is available. To be a rational 
agent, a subject is to have a rich set of mental states with determinate content and utterances 
with determinate meaning.24 Let’s focus a bit more on this claim. 
   For Davidson, even when speakers make an utterance in the absence of any audience, for 
example, when they say to themselves “What a nice day!”, “yet it matters what words are used, 
what they mean. ... there must be some reason for using those words, with their meaning, rather 
than others” (Davidson 1984b, 272). What is important in our present discussion is not the 
speakers’ “reason” for choosing the words they utter – maybe they have just learnt, or been 
conditioned, to use the words in the way they do, or as Davidson says, perhaps “it just comes 
naturally” to talk in this way, for “what magic ingredient does holding oneself responsible to 
                                                          
23 Compare this with Davidson’s similar remarks on “pure intending” and the contrast between prima facie 
(conditional) vs. all-out (unconditional) judgements about the desirability of an action. See Davidson (1978). 
24 See Davidson’s “Rational Animals” (1982) for additional remarks on this matter, such as the argument from 
the holism of the mental. 
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the usual way of speaking add to the usual way of speaking?” (Davidson 1994, 117). What 
matters here is the meaning the words have for the speaker, i.e., their intended interpretation, 
regardless of how she has been particularly taught, conditioned, disposed, or caused to use the 
words in the way she does. The words have a meaning for the speaker (and not necessarily a 
conventional or standard one, but what the speaker intends them to mean) and the speaker 
chooses those words with the meaning they have for her to express her beliefs. Without 
presuming the speaker’s knowledge of how she intends her words to be interpreted, there would 
be no meaning to be interpreted, no ground for the interpreter to even start her interpretation of 
the speaker’s responses at all. Without the assumption that the speaker knows what she means 
and believes, there would be no answer to the question why the speaker uttered the words she 
did and hence no reason for the interpreter to treat the speaker’s responses as utterances with a 
determinate meaning and generally to treat her as a rational agent. As Davidson clarifies, 
“[w]hat is impossible is that she should be wrong most of the time. The reason is apparent: 
unless there is a presumption that the speaker knows what she means, i.e. is getting her own 
language right, there would be nothing for an interpreter to interpret” (1987, 38). This leads to 
Davidson’s famous claim that “whether we like it or not, if we want to understand others, we 
must count them right in most matters” (1974b, 197).  
   Granted that this is Davidson’s official explanation of self-knowledge, let’s consider Child’s 
potential objections to my defence of the Transcendental Explanation as Davidson’s official 
explanation. 
 
6.1. Child’s Objections 
At some point, Child considers the claim that Davidson’s remarks on interpretation are to be 
treated as the real source of Davidson’s explanation of self-knowledge and attempts to resist 
the objection that his Externalist Explanation “misrepresents Davidson’s view” (Child 2007, 
164). He makes three claims, which I think are all implausible, considering my discussion of 
the Externalist Explanation in Section 5. In this part, I will respond to these objections and 
accordingly develop my criticisms of the Externalist Explanation.  
   According to his first attempt, he agrees that Davidson puts a huge emphasis on the process 
of interpretation, but he denies that this can show that his Externalist Explanation is thereby 
wrongly attributed to Davidson. He claims that Davidson has also put an emphasis on the 
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process of meaning-determination and has said that what a speaker means by her words 
depends on, or at least is partly determined by, the things in the world causing the speaker to 
apply those words. From this claim, he aims to conclude that “so my account is certainly true 
to at least one strand in Davidson” (2007, 164). This attempt, at most, would make his 
Externalist Explanation a rival interpretation of Davidson’s account. This conclusion is weak 
enough to raise no problem for my claim that Davidson’s account must alternatively be taken 
to be the Transcendental Explanation. However, in Sections 5 and 6, I showed why Child’s 
Externalist Explanation cannot be treated as an acceptable interpretation of Davidson’s 
account. I argued that not only is it an implausible explanation in general, but Davidson has 
also rejected it as an inadequate explanation of the meaning-asymmetry.  
   Child’s second attempt is to claim that the presumption that speakers are not usually wrong 
about what they mean and believe cannot be supported by Davidson’s remarks on the process 
of interpretation. According to him, in order to see whether this is true, we should see what it 
is about the process of interpretation that can sustain our presumption. It is worth noting that 
even if Child could show that Davidson’s discussion of the process of interpretation fails to 
support the presumption that speakers are often right about what they mean, this by itself could 
not show that his Externalist Explanation is correct and correctly attributable to Davidson. 
Nonetheless, Child continues by claiming that Davidson’s discussion of interpretation fails to 
offer such a support for our conceded presumption that speakers are usually right about what 
they mean because we have a way of ascribing meanings to the speaker which can violate 
Davidson’s presumption. The alternative way Child has in mind is simply this: “interpret the 
speaker’s words as meaning what those words mean on the lips of others in her community” 
(Child 2007, 165). This is just to say that, regardless of what the speaker intends to mean by 
her words, interpret those words as meaning what others mean by them, or as what the words 
standardly, normally or conventionally mean. However, one of the most significant parts of 
Davidson’s later view of meaning, as discussed in Sections 4, 5 and 6, has been dedicated to 
resisting any view that takes following some rule, convention, norm, standard, institution, and 
generally any sort of socially agreed-on way of using words to be essential to the existence of 
successful communication. Considering Davidson’s extensive remarks against such a view, 
attributing it to Davidson is completely implausible. Child himself immediately confesses that 
“[o]f course Davidson thinks that way of ascribing meanings would be wrong” (2007, 165). If 
so, why should he attribute this view to Davidson at all?  
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   I think the reason why Child does so is that he aims to justify inferring the following 
conclusion from it: the aforementioned way of ascribing meanings to the speaker would be 
wrong, for Davidson, because the meaning of the words gets determined by the things causing 
the speaker to use them, or as Child puts it, the interpreter’s so “ascriptions of meaning would 
be unacceptable in the light of other principles about meaning – specifically, the principle that 
the meanings of a speaker’s words are determined by the nature of the things that normally 
cause her to hold those words applicable” (2007, 165). Let’s pause for a moment and focus on 
Child’s claim. His aim was to show that the Transcendental Explanation cannot support the 
presumption that speakers are often right about what they mean. The reason he offered was that 
we can ascribe meanings to speakers without using the presumption. Not only did I show, 
especially in the first part of Section 6 above, why Davidson thinks this cannot be done, but 
Child himself agrees that Davidson is against such a view. What reason, hence, does he provide 
to persuade us that the Transcendental Explanation cannot support the presumption? No new 
reason. He rather claims that, for Davidson, speakers are often right about what they mean by 
their words because what they mean by their words is determined by what causes them to use 
those words. This is just to restate that Davidson’s account of the meaning-asymmetry is the 
Externalist Explanation, rather than the Transcendental Explanation. And, again, I already 
argued for why this reading of Davidson is implausible.  
   Child’s last attempt, which is not new and independent, is to restate his previous claim by 
appealing to Davidson’s use of the term “presumption”. He says that Davidson does not use 
the term “assume”, that is, Davidson does not say that the interpreter must assume that the 
speaker is right about what she means; rather, he uses the term “presumption” and what he 
means by it, according to Child, is that “there is no guarantee that a speaker is right about the 
meaning of a given word; but there is a presumption that she is. Seen this way, the presumption 
that a speaker knows what her words mean is part of the explanandum in the discussion of first 
person authority; it is not itself part of the explanans” (2007, 165). It is difficult to see how this 
claim by itself can add anything new to his previous claim and especially how it can be used 
as an argument against the Transcendental Explanation. Of course, as I indicated earlier in 
Section 6, Davidson’s concern, from the beginning, has been to explain this presumption. He 
emphasizes that the existence of the presumption is intuitively conceded; the problem is to 
explain why it must exist. As he clarifies, “it remains to show why there must be a presumption 
that speakers, but not their interpreters, are not wrong about what their words mean” (Davidson 
1984a, 12). Moreover, I emphasized that presupposing the meaning-asymmetry without 
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explaining it (and hence taking for granted what was promised to be explained) is one thing, 
presupposing the meaning-asymmetry in order to explain why it exists is another. How can one 
explain why something exists without presupposing that it exists? What I have argued for was 
that Davidson’s explanation of why this presumption necessarily holds is his Transcendental 
Explanation, rather than the Disquotational or the Externalist Explanation. Given my 
arguments against the Externalist Explanation in Section 5, nothing new has been offered by 
Child that can stand against the Transcendental Explanation as Davidson’s official account of 
self-knowledge. Nonetheless, there is still more to say about Child’s claims.  
    Child agreed that, for Davidson, the interpreter cannot work without relying on the essential 
presumption, that is, by simply taking the speaker’s words to mean what others mean by them 
in her speech-community and his reason was that doing so is wrong “in the light of other 
principles about meaning”, specifically on the basis of “the principle that the meanings of a 
speaker’s words are determined by the nature of the things that normally cause her to hold those 
words applicable”. The question is what Child means by Davidson’s “principles about 
meaning”. If by such principles he had the necessary conditions on the process of interpretation 
in mind, he would accept the Transcendental Explanation as Davidson’s explanation of the 
meaning-asymmetry. But, Child clearly does not intend to do so. He rather maintains that these 
are the principles about meaning-determination and insists that, for Davidson, the most 
important one of them is that the speaker’s words have the meaning they do because of what 
cause the speaker to use them, which, for Child, forms the foundation of Davidson’s 
explanation of the meaning-asymmetry. This leads to a further problem: it seems that Child 
blurs the crucial distinction between Davidson’s remarks on the emergence of meaning and 
mental content and Davidson’s discussion of the process of interpreting such content. This is a 
crucial distinction, failing to appreciate which would have serious destructive consequences. I 
will end this part by a brief discussion of one of such consequences. 
   Child’s reliance on Davidson’s discussion of the process of meaning-determination, which 
appears in Davidson’s discussion of triangulation, and his insistence on taking it to form the 
foundation of Davidson’s account of self-knowledge, would provide us with a further reason 
for why the Externalist Explanation is implausible and is not Davidson’s official account of 
self-knowledge. Recall that Child’s reason for why it is wrong to interpret the speaker’s words 
simply as meaning what others mean by them was that, for Davidson, it is what causes the 
speaker to apply her words to certain things in the world that gives meaning to the speaker’s 
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words. But, first of all, this reason fails to imply that the interpreter does not have to interpret 
the speaker’s words as meaning what others mean by them. The reason is that Davidson’s 
discussion of how meaning emerges and gets determined confines the speaker to mean just 
what others mean by the words, while Davidson’s discussion of the process of interpretation 
frees the speaker from such a constraint. For if, following Child, we concede that it is simply 
what causes the speaker to respond in the way she does that gives meaning to her words, 
nothing can prevent us from concluding that the speaker’s words mean what other members of 
her speech-community mean by them because, ex hypothesi, the same things which cause the 
speaker to apply her words have supposedly caused others to apply those words too. As 
Davidson argues for, especially in his famous paper “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual 
Scheme” (1974b), the speakers of a language share the same world, a common ontology: 
similar things in the world prompt them to respond in the way they do. In his discussion of the 
notion of triangulation, Davidson introduces an even more restricted condition: unless there are 
others who similarly respond to similar things in the world, as well as to each other’s responses, 
their responses would have no chance to acquire any determinate meaning.25 At this basic level 
of learning a first language, the triangulators’ “innate similarity responses … – what they 
naturally group together – must be much alike” (Davidson 1992, 120). For, otherwise, the first 
creature will respond differently to what the second creature takes to be similar. Thus, as 
Davidson says, a “condition for being a speaker is that there must be others enough like 
oneself” (1992, 120). To be similar, in this sense, implies that the triangulators must respond 
by, for instance, “tree” to certain things – i.e., trees in the world – which they group together 
similarly. Now, this means that the interpreter, say, the teacher, can ascribe meaning to the 
learner’s uttered words basically on the basis of the fact that the similar things which cause her 
to utter those words cause the learner to utter the same words. Thus, the learner’s utterance of 
“table” means table apparently because the same thing causes both the teacher and the learner 
to utter “table”, and the teacher ascribes meaning to the learner’s utterance accordingly. Child 
himself admits that Davidson rejects this way of ascribing meanings.  
                                                          
25 Introducing Davidson’s detailed discussion of the notion of triangulation would go beyond the purpose of this 
paper. The reason why the creatures’ responses can have no determinate meaning in this case is that no genuine 
disagreement between them can emerge and without making sense of such disagreements, that is, of the fact that 
there is a distinction between what is the case and what seems to be the case, error cannot emerge. As a result, we 
will be trapped in the Wittgensteinian paradox, that is, that whatever seems right to the creature would be right, 
no matter what it is. For a recent discussion of this and of Davidson’s reading of Wittgenstein, see Hossein Khani 
(2019) and (2020b). 
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   The problem is that the Externalist Explanation appears to be compatible with such a view, 
contrary to the Transcendental Explanation which takes the conditions on the process of 
interpretation to be fundamental. This forms another reason for why the Externalist 
Explanation cannot be considered as Davidson’s explanation of the meaning-asymmetry: it 
allows for a way of ascribing meaning to the speaker that violates our fundamental presumption 
and Davidson by no means would allow for such a violation. Not only this, but Davidson also 
intends to provide the speaker with freedom of choice in the practice of meaning something by 
words, that is, Davidson wants to allow for the situations in which the speaker successfully 
means chair by “table” and her use of “table” would not be regarded as incorrect or 
meaningless. Davidson’s remarks on the process of interpretation, contrary to his discussion of 
triangulation, grant such a freedom. The speaker is allowed to mean whatever she may by her 
utterance, provided that there is enough evidence for the interpreter to interpret the utterance 
in the way the speaker intended and in order for this to be possible, speakers must be treated as 
rational agents credited with knowledge of what they mean, believe and intend – unless, of 
course, there is evidence to the contrary. This is the reason why Davidson emphasizes that 
“meaning something requires that by and large one follows a practice of one’s own, a practice 
that can be understood by others” (1994, 125). The problem with Child’s claims considered 
above has its roots in failing to distinguish between Davidson’s remarks on meaning-
emergence and meaning-interpretation. 
   Davidson has carefully distinguished between mere dispositions to respond to (or mere ability 
to discriminate between) different things in the world in certain ways and making judgements 
about them. He takes the latter to be fundamental: “A creature does not have the concept of a 
cat merely because it can discriminate cats from other things … You have the concept of a cat 
only if you can make sense of the idea of … judging that something is a cat” (Davidson 1999a, 
8). A parrot can be trained or conditioned to respond by “cat” whenever a cat is present. For 
Davidson, however, it would not be acceptable to claim that the parrot means cat by such 
sounds: to be caused to respond in a certain way to certain things in the world would not be 
enough for making the claim that the creature means or believes something; the creature should 
be capable of judging that such and such a thing falls under a specific concept, such as that of 
a cat. Once the creature comes up with such a rich set of concepts and propositional attitudes, 
it is then free to apply its words in whatever way it may, provided that its utterances remain 
interpretable. This allows for the situations in which the same object, e.g., an emerald, causes 
the interpreter to utter “green” to mean green and the speaker to utter “green” to mean blue. 
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The mere fact that the emerald causes the speaker to respond by “green” does not help the 
interpreter to interpret her utterance correctly, that is, to determine what the speaker intends to 
mean by it. The availability of evidence, the interpreter’s familiarity with the speaker’s habits, 
life, attitudes, and environment, as well as luck, wisdom and so forth, would help the interpreter 
to understand what the speaker intends to mean by “green”; otherwise, the speaker has simply 
failed to mean anything at all. All of this is possible only if the speaker can be viewed as 
knowing what she means, believes and indents. This is a necessary condition on the possibility 
of interpretation. The Externalist Explanation misses such a crucial distinction between 
meaning-emergence and meaning-interpretation.  
   As I tried to argue for in this paper, it is the Transcendental Explanation, rather than the 
Externalist or the Disquotational one, that is to be considered as Davidson’s official explanation 
of self-knowledge and this explanation is compatible with Davidson’s well-known remarks on 
interpretation, the role of evidence in explaining self-knowledge, as well as the important 
distinction between describing and explaining self-knowledge. Of course, this does not mean 
that Davidson’s Transcendental Explanation is free from any problem.26 It is also important to 
note that my discussion in this paper focused on Davidson’s answer to the “why” question, 
rather than the “how” question, regarding self-knowledge. My aim has been to support 
Davidson’s Transcendental Explanation of why the meaning-asymmetry – and thus the belief-
asymmetry – must exist. The question as to “how” it is that speakers non-inferentially know 
what they mean and believe is an entirely different question. I believe Davidson is to provide 
an answer to this question too.27 Nonetheless, insofar as answering the “how” question is 
concerned, the Transcendental Explanation does not suffer from an extra or special problem: 
all the explanations discussed in this paper face the same problem, that is, the problem of 
explaining how each speaker obtains authoritative knowledge of what she means and believes.  
Neither the Externalist Explanation nor the Disquotational Explanation could successfully 
explain how speakers know what they mean and believe. The reason is that if the source of the 
speaker’s authoritative knowledge of what she means and believes is neither her ability to 
                                                          
26 For some potential problems, see, e.g., Jacobsen (2009), Gallois (1997, Chapter 9), Shoemaker (1996, Chapter 
3), Ludwig (1994) and Beisecker (2003). 
27 I cannot claim that Davidson’s own works on self-knowledge can offer a straightforward answer to the “how” 
question. But, I believe that this question can be answered at least on behalf of Davidson via, for instance, 
interpreting his remarks on meaning and intention as suggesting a sort of judgement-dependent account of 
meaning and intention, along the lines proposed by Wright. Nonetheless, this would be the subject of a different 
investigation. 
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disquotationally specify the meaning of her words, nor the fact that certain things in the word 
typically cause her to use those words, the Externalist and the Disquotation Explanation would 
lack the resources needed for explaining how the speaker knows what she means and believes. 
The conclusion of my arguments, therefore, would be that if one is to investigate Davidson’s 
explanation of self-knowledge, it is his Transcendental Explanation that should be the focus of 
such an investigation. 
 
7. Conclusion 
I argued that Davidson’s official explanation of self-knowledge is his Transcendental 
Explanation, rather than the Disquotational or the Externalist one. Not only do such 
explanations fail to explain first-person authority, but Davidson himself has already rejected 
them as entirely implausible.28 
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